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This article aims to show that the tools being used to recalibrate the
international investment regime, in particular proportionality and
corporate social responsibility, constitute continuity rather than rupture
with neoliberalism and neoliberal legality. Neoliberalism has been
discredited, and few actors suggest a return to self-regulation after the
2008 global economic crisis. This call for regulation, however, finds
international economic law scholarship divided between those who claim
that standards of review and corporate social responsibility can solve the
crisis of neoliberalism, and those who believe that the problem is more
profound. In the case of the international investment regime, this article
suggests that the current strategy to balance this regime consists only of
adjustments to states' regulatory authority, leaving intact the legal
techniques that foreign investors use to control local resources. The
contractualization of foreign investment relations remains today as
important as it was before the 2008 global economic crisis. In this way,
this article concludes, the current balancing strategy marginally changes
the means and does not change the purpose provided by neoliberalism.
INTRODUCTION: NEOLIBERALISM AS USUAL?
The present status of neoliberalism is the subject of controversy.
Some literature describes the period beginning after the global economic
crisis of 2008 as postneoliberal or, simply, after neoliberalism.1 For
* Assistant Professor, Universidad Externado de Colombia. PhD, London School of
Economics and Political Science. I would like to thank Mika Viljanen, an anonymous
reviewer, and the participants of the Law in the Lighthouse Workshop, University of
Turku, for their comments and suggestions. As always, all errors remain mine only.
1. See, e.g., Elmar Altvater, Postneoliberalism or Postcapitalism? The Failure of
Neoliberalism in the Financial Market Crisis, 51 DEV. DIALOGUE 73 (2009).
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these authors, there has been an important shift from the economic and
social policies that dominated the 1980s and 1990s.2 There is other
equally important work, however, that describes our current period as a
continuation of neoliberalism. This scholarship recognizes some
marginal changes but, as Crouch suggests, these minor adjustments
rather reflect the "non-death" of neoliberalism.3 It is just a marginal
adaptation of neoliberalism to the undeniable facts of the global
economic crisis and the risks of climate change.
In the field of international economic law, this controversy shapes
much of the current academic debate. The dominant literature blames
neoliberalism for overlooking private negative externalities and
noneconomic issues, such as the environment and human rights. For
these authors, international law should recognize the right of states to
regulate business activity, in particular, with the purpose of protecting
the environment and human rights.4 This means increasing the
pressure on the World Trade Organization (WTO) and the negotiators of
investment treaties to acknowledge that state objectives exceed those of
free trade and foreign investment protection.5 But not everybody agrees
with this view. Some voices claim that this balancing strategy does not
deal with the more profound problems of neoliberalism, such as rising
inequality and the excessive power of multinational corporations
(MNCs). This critical scholarship calls for reimagining international law
institutions or resisting investment arbitration and free trade
agreements.6 This article aims to make a modest contribution to this
debate by showing that the current balancing strategy of the
international investment regime (IIR) suggests more continuity than
rupture with neoliberalism.
First, it is necessary to clarify what I mean by neoliberalism for the
purposes of this article. There is abundant literature on neoliberalism,
covering issues ranging from the ascendance of corporate power to the
homo economicus.7 These discussions inspire this work, but, for my
2. See Thomas Cottier, International Economic Law in Transition from Trade
Liberalization to Trade Regulation, 17 J. INT'L ECON. L. 671, 672-73 (2014).
3. COLIN CROUCH, THE STRANGE NON-DEATH OF NEOLIBERALISM 22-23 (2011).
4. See Jos6 E. Alvarez, Why Are We "Re-Calibrating" Our Investment Treaties?, 4
WORLD ARB. & MEDIATION REV. 143, 154 (2010); Markus Wagner, Regulatory Space in
International Trade Law and International Investment Law, 36 U. PA. J. INT'L L. 1 (2014).
5. In relation with the WTO, see ANDREW LANG, WORLD TRADE LAW AFIER
NEOLIBERALIsM: RE-IMAGINING THE GLOBAL ECONOMIC ORDER 221-71 (2011).
6. See, e.g., id.; DAVID SCHNEIDERMAN, RESISTING ECONOMIC GLOBALIZATION:
CRITICAL THEORY AND INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW 11-15 (2013).
7. See generally WILLIAM K. CARROLL, THE MAKING OF A TRANSNATIONA CAPITALIST
CLASS: CORPORATE POWER IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY (2010); PIERRE DARDOT &
CHRISTIAN LAVAL, THE NEW WAY OF THE WORLD: ON NEOLIBERAL SOCIETY (Gregory Elliot
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modest objective here, it is enough to refer to neoliberalism as a set of
means to achieve certain social and economic purposes. These purposes
not only provide answers to social and individual problems but also, and
more importantly, frame these problems. Hamlet's famous "to be or not
to be" has been interpreted as a moral paradigm that already sets the
background for any answer to his question.8 Neoliberalism does
something similar. Those who choose neoliberalism to frame social
problems want to maximize individual material preferences, i.e. their
purpose, and think that private authority can do much better than
public sovereignty in achieving this goal.
Neoliberal legality is a means to this end. It is a means to enable
private control of resources and facilitate private investment, while
blocking alternatives such as public experimentation and intervention.
Neoliberal legality obviously includes more than the control of
resources, but here, I am interested in this part of neoliberal legality:
the dominant social and legal practices to grant, exercise, and protect
private control of resources, in particular, those resources related to
foreign investment.9 In this particular context, neoliberal legality puts
states under market supervision not only by enforcing private property
rights but also by imposing on states an internal market discipline.10
This discipline applies both to what states cannot do and, perhaps more
importantly, to what states can do. First, states need to act through
contractual legal techniques to tap private energies and promote
economic growth.'1 Second, state regulation is subject to the permanent
supervision of a number of institutions that share key characteristics.
They are autonomous, independent, and isolated from state politics,
characteristics that are often summarized in the concept of
depoliticization.1
2
The regime that governs foreign investment relations is an example
of neoliberal legality. The IIR presently consists of a network of more
trans., Verso 2013) (2009); PAUL VERHAEGHE, WHAT ABOUT ME?: THE STRUGGLE FOR
IDENTITY IN A MARKET-BASED SOCIETY (Jane Hedley trans., Pr6le 2014) (2014).
8. Harold Jenkins, To Be or Not to Be: Hamlet's Dilemma, 13 HAMLET STUD. 8, 22-23
(1991).
9. See PATRICIA EWICK & SUSAN S. SILBEY, THE COMMON PLACE OF LAW: STORIES
FROM EVERYDAY LIFE 20-22 (1998).
10. See, e.g., MICHEL FOUCAULT, THE BIRTH OF BIOPOLITICS: LECTURES AT THE
COLLEGE DE FRANCE 1978-1979, at 239-41 (Graham Burchell trans., 2008) (2004);
ALASDAIR ROBERTS, THE LOGIC OF DIscIPLINE: GLOBAL CAPITALISM AND THE
ARCHITECTURE OF GOVERNMENT 5-17 (2010); Bronwen Morgan, The Economization of
Politics: Meta-Regulation as a Form of Nonjudicial Legality, 12 Soc. & LEGAL STUD. 489,
493 (2003).
11. Peer Zumbansen, The Law of Society: Governance Through Contract, 14 IND. J.
GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 191, 194 (2007).
12. ROBERTS, supra note 10, at 3-2 1.
INDIANA JOURNAL OF GLOBAL LEGAL STUDIES 23:2
than 3,000 bilateral and regional international treaties for the
protection of foreign investment.13 This regime is based on a
contractualized view of foreign investment relations; on this view,
foreign investments are the results of bargains, and the IIR is the result
of a "grand bargain."'4 The treaties that make up this regime also
recognize that wealth maximization through private foreign investment
is the purpose of foreign investment protection, and they have gradually
acknowledged the relevance of this goal not only for foreign investors
and host states but also for local populations.15 With this purpose in
mind, international arbitration tribunals can review any state action
according to the standards set out in these treaties. In essence, from the
arbitrators' point of view, states can regulate; but regulation must be
technical, reasonable, and proportionate. Political reasons should not be
favored because they could affect privately led wealth maximization.16
The objective of this article is to show that the strategy to balance
the IIR after the global economic crisis, in particular corporate social
responsibility (CSR) and proportionality, does not change the nature of
this regime as a means to neoliberal ends. The CSR movement claims
that corporations have an incentive to behave in a socially responsible
manner for reputational reasons.17 Although CSR emerged in the 1960s,
its use has been widely supported after the global financial crisis as an
adequate response to corporate misconduct. Proportionality, on the
13. U.N. Conference on Trade & Dev., World Investment Report 2015: Reforming
International Investment Governance 24, U.N. Doc. UNCTAD/WIR2015 (June 24, 2015)
[hereinafter UNCTAD].
14. Jeswald W. Salacuse & Nicholas P. Sullivan, Do BITs Really Work?: An Evaluation
of Bilateral Investment Treaties and Their Grand Bargain, 46 HARV. INT'L L.J. 67, 77
(2005).
15. This is apparent from the preambles of the 1984, 2004, and 2012 U.S. model
bilateral investment treaties (BITs). See 1984 MODEL BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATY:
U.S. MODEL TREATY CONCERNING THE RECIPROCAL ENCOURAGEMENT AND PROTECTION OF
INVESTMENT OF FEBRUARY 24, 1984 (1984) ("a stable framework for investment and
maximum effective utilization of economic resources"); 2004 MODEL BILATERAL
INVESTMENT TREATY: TREATY BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF
AMERICA AND THE GOVERNMENT OF [COUNTRY] CONCERNING THE ENCOURAGEMENT AND
RECIPROCAL PROTECTION OF INVESTMENT (2004) ("a stable framework for investment will
maximize effective utilization of economic resources and improve living standards"); 2012
U.S. MODEL BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATY: TREATY BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND THE GOVERNMENT OF [COUNTRY] CONCERNING THE
ENCOURAGEMENT AND RECIPROCAL PROTECTION OF INVESTMENT (2012) ("a stable
framework for investment will maximize effective utilization of economic resources and
improve living standards").
16. See Int'l Thunderbird Gaming Corp. v. Mexico, UNCITRAL, Award and Separate
Opinion of Thomas W. Walde, 37 (Jan. 26, 2006).
17. Adam Lindgreen & Valbrie Swaen, Corporate Social Responsibility, 12 INT'L J.
MGMT. REVS. 1 (2010).
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other hand, is a legal doctrine that assists adjudicators in balancing
different goals and values, e.g., between investment protection and
social and environmental goals.'8 My main argument in this article is
that CSR and proportionality make only marginal adjustments to
accommodate some form of state regulation. This is because none of
these tools reduces the use of contractual techniques, nor changes the
transactional paradigm in the relations between foreign investors and
host states. These adjustments, rather, extend market supervision over
states into new terrain, from any public interference in the individual
control of resources to the state regulation of the private use of
resources.
This article is organized as follows. Part I describes the struggle for
the control of resources between private actors, in particular foreign
investors and host states. It introduces the main analytical and legal
questions regarding this struggle, which relate to the property-contract
interface. This section underscores foreign investors' need for
calculability, and the use of contractual techniques to satisfy this need
(i.e., the means). Part II focuses on the neoliberal character of
international investment law. It consists of three subparts. The first
describes the contractualization of foreign investor relations; the second
explores the investment awards resulting from the 2001 Argentine
crisis as an example of this contractualization; and the third draws
some conclusions about the relationship between the property-contract
interface and neoliberal legality. Part III examines the post-economic-
crisis era. It shows that neither CSR nor proportionality undermines the
means of neoliberal legality or the ends of neoliberalism.
The article concludes by suggesting that the future of state and
political authority over resources will be marked by our attitudes to
wealth maximization. Neoliberal legality may continue to suffer some
adjustments, for instance as a result of the demand for state regulation,
but this will not be enough to dissolve neohberalism into a new political
and social paradigm. The path to such a paradigmatic change requires
framing and answering differently some fundamental social questions,
including those related to the use of resources.
I. THE STRUGGLE FOR RESOURCES: STATES, INDIDUALS, AND FOREIGN
INVESTORS
Very often, the struggle for property rights is described as a struggle
for the allocation of resources. With this idea in mind, some authors who
promote private forms of property suggest that, once the allocation
18. ROBERT ALEXY, A THEORY OF CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS 101-09 (2010).
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process finishes, social peace becomes more attainable. This is possible,
these authors claim, because after the establishment of private property
individuals gain certainty about the distribution of key resources.19 But
reality indicates something different, as wealth inequality is currently a
major problem. The struggle for distribution never ends, in fact, and
this is a main liberal argument for a civil government. For Locke,
"government has no other end but the preservation of property."20
In truth, the struggle for resources is analytically and socially even
more complicated than this, because property rules define the allocation
as well as the use of resources. The organization of resources in the form
of private property rights would be socially impossible without granting
an actor the authority to coordinate the use of resources. As soon as the
self-regulation myth fades-together with fictions such as complete
information-any community requires an actor to ensure that private
property owners will not annihilate each other and the entire
community.21 The state normally appears in the picture as the actor
with underlying authority over every resource, including those allocated
privately.
State authority to coordinate property, however, opens up a site of
struggle between individuals and the state. The birth of the liberal state
brought about an inherent tension between private property and state
authority. The state was conceived to protect private property, but its
creation came with a high cost for property defenders: the death of
natural law and the birth of private law.22 Thinking about property as
an artefact of private law endows states with broad authority to reform
the laws and shape the scope of ownership, without affecting the private
allocation of the rights. As opposed to allocation, which is clear, the
scope of private property rights is malleable, and different .property
interpretations can expand or reduce the scope of ownership.23 This has
important consequences because, as Cohen notes, sovereignty and
private property are correlative concepts.24 The public authority to
define property, then, implies that market-state dynamics can be
shaped and reshaped by the state. In the postwar years, Keynesian
19. See Hans-Hermann Hoppe, The Ethics and Economics of Private Property, in THE
ELGAR COMPANION TO THE ECONOMICS OF PROPERTY RIGHTS 48, 49-53 (Enrico Colombatto
ed., 2004).
20. JOHN LOCKE, THE SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT § 94 (Barnes & Noble ed.
2004) (1689).
21. See RICHARD T. ELY, PROPERTY AND CONTRACT IN THEIR RELATION TO THE
DISTRIBUTION OF WEALTH 165 (1914).
22. See STEFANO RODOTA, EL TERRIBLE DERECHO: ESTUDIOS SOBRE LA PROPIEDAD
PRIVADA 101-02 (1986).
23. Joseph William Singer, Sovereignty and Property, 86 NW. U. L. REV. 1, 47 (1991).
24. Morris R. Cohen, Property and Sovereignty, 13 CORNELL L. REV. 8, 10 (1927).
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policies drew on these insights to reshape market structures while
generally respecting the private allocation of resources.
25
In part, neoliberalism is a response to this policy of public control of
resources, even to the mere possibility of such control. It criticizes state
intervention in the use of resources due to its inefficiency and moral
inappropriateness.26 The policies implemented to redefine the role of the
state in the 1980s and 1990s were a mixture of privatizations and large
political transformations. The main premise behind these
transformations was that economic growth is the best social policy, and
that corporations-particularly large MNCs-can coordinate the use of
resources more efficiently than can the state, promoting growth and
prosperity.27 These neoliberal reforms redefined the state in market
terms, ensuring that the remaining public functions are exercised in
manners compatible with the operation of market actors.
28
The private law dimension of neoliberalism shapes public action by
promoting legal techniques that block, minimize, or make state
intervention excessively costly. These techniques are mainly proprietary
and contractual. At the property level, the strategy has been to
disseminate a strong view of private property by connecting property
rights with economic growth. Governments, in the view of authors like
De Soto and North, should not intervene after the creation of private
property entitlements-even if they legitimately could-because this
would hinder economic prosperity. Kennedy brilliantly describes this
strategy, pointing out that there is still no evidence of this connection.
29
At the contractual level the strategy is more subtle, and perhaps for
this reason more effective from the perspective of individual actors.
Since the second half of the 20th century, MNCs have used contractual
techniques to ensure their control of foreign resources.30 Foreign
investors have never trusted property entitlements under domestic law,
and have therefore negotiated with states specific legal commitments
regarding the use of resources. The most common are tax stabilization
clauses. MNCs rely on contracts to impose on states negative duties to
block state interventions, supplementing their default scope of
ownership according to the applicable legislation.
31
25. RODOTA, supra note 22.
26. FOUCAULT, supra note 10, at 101-21.
27. Id. at 131.
28. Id. at 172, 191,201.
29. David Kennedy, Some Caution About Property Rights as a Recipe for Economic
Development, 1 ACCT., ECON., & L. 1, 49 (2011).
30. See Thomas W. Waelde & George Ndi, Stabilizing International Investment
Commitments: International Law Versus Contract Interpretation, 31 TEX. INT'L L.J. 215,
234 (1996).
31. Id.
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MNCs have significant incentives to follow these contractual
strategies. Calculability is essential to take rational investment
decisions.32 Host states, however, can change the law after the
establishment of a project. The purpose of contracting for property is to
ensure the economic viability of the project and the subsequent profit.
Foreign investors involved in the production of gold, for instance, have a
mining right that entitles them to extract the mineral. This entitlement,
however, may not be enough to ensure the long-term economic viability
of the project. These foreign investors require that the state does not
change tax, environmental, or any other regulations that can make the
business less or not profitable.3 3 The utility of contractual techniques is
that they can effectively diminish the probability of change.
Contracts governing resources, obviously, have effects well beyond
the parties to the agreement. These are not the typical small-scale,
everyday contracts with few if any direct implications for third parties.
To the contrary, they are highly political deals and affect the entire
community, starting -but not ending-with state authority. As Katz
has put it, states cannot block the authority of private property owners
to decide on the use of resources, but they can alter these rights by
legislation narrowing or expanding the potential uses of private
property.34 This threat to calculability is countered by contractual
techniques. State contracts under international law, as we will see next,
can create micro-laissez-faire areas in domains as significant as
taxation, the environment, and labor standards.3 5 Private law
principles, such as pacta sunt servanda, once migrated and embedded
into public international law, can disarticulate fundamental principles
of state authority36 in a manner entirely consistent with a neoliberal
rationality.37
32. See Max Weber, Parliament and Government in Germany Under a New Political
Order, in WEBER: POLITICAL WRITINGS 130, 147-48 (Peter Lassman ed., Ronald Speirs
trans., 1994) (reasoning that the main inner foundation of the modern capitalist business
is calculation).
33. Some examples of these clauses can be found in Andrea Shemberg, Stabilization
Clauses and Human Rights, (a report prepared for the International Finance Corporation
and the United Nations Special Representative to the Secretary General on Business and
Human Rights), March 11, 2008.
34. Larissa Katz, Red Tape and Gridlock, 23 CAN. J.L. & JURISPRUDENCE 99, 113-14
(2010).
35. William E. Scheuerman, Economic Globalization and the Rule of Law, 6
CONSTELLATIONS 3, 6-8 (1999) (explaining the attractiveness of international arbitration
and its resemblance to a system of private self-regulation).
36. ANTONY ANGHIE, IMPERIALISM, SOVEREIGNTY AND THE MAKING OF INTERNATIONAL
LAW 239-40 (2004).
37. See FOUCAULT, supra note 10.
INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT REGIME AFTER NEOLIBERALISM 611
II. NEOLIBERALISM AND THE INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT REGIME
There has been much academic discussion on the IIR in the last ten
years. Most of this discussion fits the needs of practitioners, but there is
also important work on substantive questions of this regime.38 The
contractualization of foreign investment relations, however, has not
been a concrete topic of analysis so far. The next three subparts study
this process by focusing on the legal techniques that deal with foreign
investors' control of resources.
As an initial matter, it is important to mention two points relevant
to this analysis developed by the literature on investment law. First, an
important strand of the literature has noted the colonial, postcolonial,
and imperial origin of the IIR. 39 This relates to the globalization of some
Western ideas and values tightly connected with the means and ends
promoted by neoliberalism. Second, many authors have discussed the
legal nature of this regime, emphasising the public law character of
investment arbitration. Some authors have done so to criticize the IIR,
40
but the majority have drawn on ideas from global administrative and
constitutional law to save the IIR from its legitimacy crisis by, for
instance, incorporating proportionality analysis.41 The debate regarding
the legal nature of the IIR illustrates the neoliberal pedigree of this
regime: for those who focus on global administrative and constitutional
law, the main subject to be regulated is the host state.
42
38. See generally Stephan W. Schill, W(h)ither Fragmentation? On the Literature aad
Sociology of International Investment Law, 22 EUR. J. INT'L L. 875 (2011) (providing an
overview of the monographic literature both within and about international investment
law).
39. See, e.g., KATE MILES, THE ORIGINS OF INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW: EMPIRE,
ENVIRONMENT, AND THE SAFEGUARDING OF CAPITAL (2013) (examining the historical
evolution of international investment law); M. Sornarajah, Power and Justice in Foreign
Investment Arbitration, 14 J. INT'L. ARB. 103 (1997) (reasoning that foreign investment
arbitration replaced gun-boat diplomacy as a way to resolve foreign investment disputes).
40. See Gus VAN HARTEN, INVESTMENT TREATY ARBITRATION AND PUBLIc LAW (2007).
41. For some efforts to recalibrate investment arbitration relying on global
administrative and public law, see SANTIAGO MONTT, STATE LIABILITY IN INVESTMENT
TREATY ARBITRATION: GLOBAL CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW IN THE BIT
GENERATION (2009); INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW AND COMPARATIVE PUBLIC LAW
(Stephan W. Schill ed., 2010).
42. See Muthucumaraswamy Sornarajah, The Case Against a Regime on International
Investment Law, in REGIONALISM IN INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW 475, 493-95 (Leon
E. Trakman & Nicola W. Ranieri eds., 2013) (discussing international investment law as a
part of global administrative law).
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A. The Contractualization of Foreign Investment Relations and the
International Investment Regime
According to the principles of public and private international law,
the control of resources is a question of domestic law. This presently
undisputed premise, at least formally, was contestable at a time when
the main justification for private property was found in natural law.43
This debate ended with the creation of the modern state and the idea of
territorial sovereignty, which consolidated the domestic authority to
govern the resources located in the national territory.44 The regulation
of private property thus became a civil or common law matter.45 But
despite the effects of the idea of sovereignty, some external restrictions
on property protection-based on the natural law ideas of Vitoria and
Grotius of the 17th century-continued to be relevant in the
international sphere.46 Viner has gone so far as to claim that one of the
key outstanding characteristics of the evolution of international law
"was its attempt to build a legal protection for property."47
Customary international laws of foreign property protection do not
impose new property rules on the domestic legal orders. The premise
instead is that there is a minimum standard of treatment that states
need to respect when regulating the private property rights of foreign
investors.48 The minimum standard prohibits host states from behaving
in an egregious, outrageous, shocking, or otherwise extraordinary
manner.49 This standard also includes the prohibition to expropriate
property without paying compensation according to international law.
The international laws on expropriations impose four requirements for
their legality: they must be for a public purpose, not discriminatory, in
accord with due process of law, and paid for by a prompt, adequate and
effective compensation.5 0 Until the 1970s, in addition, the regulation of
expropriations according to customary international laws was closely
connected with the doctrine of acquired rights, which tribunals applied
to specify the scope of foreign investor rights.5 1
43. See ERNST RABEL, THE CONFLICT OF LAWS: A COMPARATIVE STUDY 7-8, 30 (1958)
(describing the rise of the thirteenth century conceptual view that territorial law governs
not only persons, but also personal property).
44. See id.
45. See id.
46. F.V. GARCfA-AMADOR, THE CHANGING LAW OF INTERNATIONAL CLAIMS 46 (1984).
47. JACOB VINER, INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS: STUDIES 218 (1951).
48. Edwin Borchard, The "Minimum Standard" of the Treatment of Aliens, 38 MICH. L.
REV. 445, 448, 454-60 (1940).
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. ANGHIE, supra note 36, at 213-20, 239-43.
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These standards are quite vague and ambiguous, and it was left to
tribunals to define notions such as "egregious" conduct and "adequate
compensation." But what emerges from a historical analysis of
customary international laws-and in particular the doctrine of
acquired rights-is that the scope of foreign investor rights was to be
interpreted according to domestic laws, turning these laws into a main
denominator of foreign investment relations.
52
From the perspective of foreign investors, customary international
laws granted protection against host-state misconduct, unfair domestic
tribunals, and inadequate compensation. This, however, fell short of
ensuring the calculability required by large private projects. Leaving
aside the procedural obstacles to launching international claims, foreign
investors still had to deal with the operation of domestic laws on the
scope of their rights. As explained above, host states can use their
regulatory authority to modify the use of resources, narrowing or
expanding the scope of foreign investor rights.53 For some time, states
were limited by the dominant economic ideas of laissez-faire and, in the
postcolonial context, the laws inherited from the former colonial
empires.54 This changed in the 1960s and 1970s, however, when
developing states mastered legal techniques capable of controlling many
aspects of foreign investment according to the interventionist ideas of
the time.55 These legal techniques were based on the notion that
customary international laws do not promote absolute property rights;
or, at least, they had abandoned this idea, together with the courts of
most countries, after the economic crisis of 1930.56
Against this background, it was reasonable to see an increasing
interest of foreign investors in state contracts. These contracts could
provide the certainty that was missing in customary international law.
At first, this possibility was highly debatable because it remained
unclear whether state breaches of contracts could constitute a violation
of international law. To the extent that domestic law governed state
52. See Borchard, supra note 48, at 448; Bin Cheng, The Rationale of Compensation for
Expropriation, 44 TRANSACTIONS GROTIUS SoC'Y 267, 282-83 (1958) (describing the
principle of vested rights with regard to state interference in the property of foreigners).
53. See supra Part I.
54. ANGHIE, supra note 36, at 213-14; A. Fatouros, International Law and the Third
World, 50 VA. L. REV. 783, 811 (1964).
55. See generally FRED BERGSTEN ET AL., AMERICAN MULTINATIONALS AND AMERICAN
INTERESTS 369-99 (1978) (detailing the ascendance of developing host countries and host
country relationships with foreign investors).
56. See ANDREAS ZIMMERMANN ET AL., THE STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF
JUSTICE: A COMMENTARY 68 (2006) (analyzing the principle of peaceful settlement of
disputes in the practice of the United Nations); Oscar Chinn (U.K. v BeIg.), 1934 P.C.I.J.
(ser. A/B), No. 63, 88 (Dec. 12).
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contracts, some authors argued that these agreements were subject to
changes in the same way as private property rights. The focus on
domestic laws blurred the fundamental importance of the pacta sunt
servanda principle: if the host state changed the laws applicable to the
contract, many thought that the pacta sunt servanda principle was not
triggered.57 From the 1930s until the 1960s, many tribunals favored this
rather limited interpretation of the pacta sunt servanda principle
between individuals and states.58  This was consistent with
Keynesianism and the domestic development of new approaches to
administrative contracts. In the domain of foreign investment, in
particular, host states relied on ideas such as the public interest to force
the renegotiation of many foreign investment contracts, which foreign
investors accepted reluctantly.59
This changed dramatically in the 1960s and 1970s, when many
academics and tribunals began reinvigorating the principle of pacta
sunt servanda in international law.60 The emerging view was that
contracts, such as concessions, grant rights to foreign investors that
states cannot extinguish or modify unilaterally.61 Annihilating
contractual rights through new laws or regulations constituted
confiscatory measures equivalent to the abrogation of property rights.
The main justification for this position is that the use of state sovereign
authority to modify the terms of contracts is a form of arbitrary
behavior.62 This shift in the interpretation of contracts was consistent
with the emerging neoliberal and neo-institutional literature. This line
of thinking saw contracts as highly efficient tools for coordination, a
premise which was influential at the international level where
academics were concentrating precisely on foreign investment
relations.63 Their concern was not simply academic: the number of
57. F.A. Mann, State Contracts and State Responsibility, 54 AM. J. INT'L L. 572, 580-81
(1960).
58. Id. at 577-80; F.V. Garcia-Amador, State Responsibility in Case of "Stabilization"
Clauses, 2 J. TRANSNAT'L L. & PoLY 23, 23-29 (1993).
59. WOLFGANG PETER, ARBITRATION AND RENEGOTIATION OF INTERNATIONAL
INVESTMENT AGREEMENTS 186-93, 198 (1995).
60. STEPHEN M. SCHWEBEL, On Whether the Breach by a State of a Contract with an
Alien is a Breach of International Law, in JUSTICE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 425, 426-29
(Stephen Schwebel ed., 1994); see, e.g., R.Y. Jennings, State Contracts in International
Law, 37 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 156, 168, 177 (1961).
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. RAYMOND VERNON, SOVEREIGNTY AT BAY: THE MULTINATIONAL SPREAD OF U.S.
ENTERPRISES 46 (1971); see also OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, THE ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS OF
CAPITALISM: FIRMS, MARKETS, RELATIONAL CONTRACrING 52 (1985).
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expropriations had reached a historical peak by the start of the 1970s.
64
By the 1990s, the focus of the literature had shifted entirely. This
can be seen in the strong interest in creating an efficient mechanism to
enforce the initial bargain between foreign investor and host state.
65
This obviously required a different approach to pacta sunt servanda.
This principle had to become the keystone of the international laws
applicable to foreign investment, which in fact it did from the 1990s to
the 2000s, thanks to the flourishing of the IIR. As Reisman affirms,
If there is one constant systemic implication in every
application of international investment law, it is pacta
sunt servanda: it is the maintenance of the belief in all
relevant parties that the legitimate expectations of
qualified investors based on legal commitments by
states are meaningful and will be enforced. No more!
66
It is intriguing, in this context, that the implications of the IIR for
the interpretation of foreign investor rights have not been the main
interest of the literature.67 A quick look at investment awards, in fact,
shows a process of contractualization that has increased the importance
of the pacta sunt servanda principle in the reasoning of investment
arbitrators. Today arbitrators rarely rely on the acquired rights
doctrine; they have replaced acquired rights with legitimate
expectations.68 Investment tribunals currently protect from host states
not only contractual rights but also foreign investor expectations
64. See Stephen J. Kobrin, Expropriation as an Attempt to Control Foreign Firms in
LDCs: Trends from 1960 to 1979, 28 INT'L STUD. Q. 329, 329 (1984) (explaining that
expropriations "were concentrated during the early 1970s" and that their incidence
significantly declined afterward).
65. See, e.g., Jan Paulsson, Arbitration without Privity. 10 ICSID REV. 232-57 (1995);
Jan Paulsson, The Power of States to Make Meaningful Promises to Foreigners, 1 J INT.
DIsp. SETTLEMENT 341 (2010).
66. W. Michael Reisman, 'Case Specific Mandates' versus 'Systemic Implications: How
Should Investment Tribunals Decide?-The Freshfields Arbitration Lecture, 29 ARB. INT'L
131, 151 (2013).
67. See NicolAs M. Perrone, The International Investment Regime and Foreign Investor
Rights: Another View of a Popular Story, 11 MANCHESTER J. INT'L ECON. L. 397, 398 (2014)
(arguing that current perspectives of the IIR overlook considerations relating to foreign
investor rights and the control of resources).
68. Emmanuel Gaillard, Chronique des sentences arbitrales-Centre International pour
le R~glement des Diffrrends Relatifs aux Investissemenrts (CIRDI), REVUE TRIMESTRIELLE
LEXIS NEXIS JURIS CLASSEUR 311, 332 (2008) (noting that the "legitimate expectation" of
investors at the beginning of the twenty-first century finds its analogue in the notion of
the "acquired right" at the beginning of the twentieth century).
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emerging from promises and representations.69  The legitimate-
expectations doctrine focuses on the dealings between foreign investors
and host states at the moment of establishment. The TECMED v Mexico
tribunal was one of the first to apply the doctrine of legitimate
expectations in an investment arbitration. The arbitrators considered it
their duty to assess the exercise of state action against "the deprivation
of economic rights and the legitimate expectations of [those] who
suffered such deprivation."70 The investment treaty, "in light of the good
faith principle established by international law, requires the
Contracting Parties to provide to international investments treatment
that does not affect the basic expectations that were taken into account
by the foreign investor to make the investment."7'
B. A Case of Contractualization: Argentina and the 2001 Economic
Crisis
In the aftermath of the economic crisis of 2001, many foreign
investors initiated investment arbitrations against Argentina.72 The
country was forced to repeal the currency peg of the Argentine peso to
the U.S. dollar because of unsustainable social and macroeconomic
indicators, and, as a result, many foreign investors involved in the
public utility and energy sectors saw their profits reduced substantially.
The salaries and savings of Argentines generally were reduced in
similar proportions. In the context of the most severe economic crisis
ever suffered by Argentina, it was to be expected that everybody in the
population-and their property rights-would be affected. But, as
opposed to national corporations and individuals, foreign investors had
two legal points in their favor. They could rely on their foreign investor
rights specified according to the legitimate-expectations doctrine, and
they could enforce these rights through investment arbitration.
Foreign investors, who established themselves in Argentina during
the 1990s, had been seduced not only by a fast-growing economy, but
69. Michele PotestA, Legitimate Expectations in Investment Treaty Law: Understanding
the Roots and the Limits of a Controversial Concept, 28 ICSID REV. 88, 88 (2013) ('[If] one
observes the awards given by investment treaty tribunals in the last few years, one will
hardly find any example where the concept of 'legitimate expectations' has not been
invoked by the claimant and, at least to a certain extent, endorsed by the tribunal.").
70. TECMED v. Mexico, ICSID Case No. ARB (AF)/00102, Award, 1 122 (May 29,
2003).
71. Id. 154.
72. NicolAs Perrone, Inversiones Extranjeras. Demandas contra la Argentina por
controversias vinculadas con la crisis del aho 2001, at 1 (Centro de Estudios
Interdisciplinarios de Derecho Industrial y Econ6mico, Working Paper, 2008), available at
www.derecho.uba.ar/investigacion/demandas.pdf.
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also by a regulatory framework under which tariffs were calculated in
dollars according to the U.S. Producer Price Index (PPI). When this
framework was repealed, the first legal issue that emerged was whether
this framework was a piece of regulation that Argentina could modify
unilaterally, as a result of its sovereign powers, or whether there was a
negative duty-created by either a contractual or quasicontractual
right-limiting these changes.7 3 The decision on the scope of foreign
investor rights-or their legitimate expectations, in the investment
arbitration jargon-would shape the discussion on the authority of
Argentina to pass the challenged measures using concepts such as the
proportionality, reasonableness, and necessity of the measures in view
of the severe economic crisis. This decision would also frame any debate
regarding whether or not Argentina was exempted from complying with
its obligations because it had to prioritize the welfare of a society that
was at the brink of collapse.
74
Most of these tribunals found that the foreign investors had a
legitimate expectation as to the maintenance of dollar-denominated
tariffs. The duty of Argentina not to modify this aspect of the tariff
system was not explicitly included in the concession agreements (i.e., it
was not a clear contractual right), but the arbitrators found that it
clearly emerged from the bidding rules, the memoranda prepared for
that purpose, and the general regulatory framework. According to the
tribunals, the foreign investors legitimately relied on these promises to
make the investment decisions. These promises were, in other words,
the source of private calculability. This way of reasoning can be found in
the awards rendered in National Grid v. Argentina, BG v. Argentina,
Sempra v. Argentina, Enron v. Argentina, LG&E v. Argentina, and CMS
v. Argentina.
7 5
The rulings of these tribunals confirm the hypothesis of
contractualization. Rather than enforcing domestic laws in a
nondiscriminatory and even-handed manner, states have the obligation
to treat foreign investors according to their legitimate expectations.
73. See Total S.A. v. Arg. Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/04/01, Liability, 176-81
(Dec. 27, 2010).
74. Cf. Joseph L. Sax, Takings and the Police Power, 74 YALE L.J. 36, 52-53, 60 (1964)
(giving examples of when legislatures were exempt from complying with their obligations
in light of an "ensuring total or near total destruction of values").
75. National Grid Plc. v. Argentina, UNCITRAL, Award, 9 56-57, 62, 173-80 (Nov. 3,
2008); BG v. Argentina, UNCITRAL, Award, 19 294-310 (Dec. 24, 2007); Sempra v.
Argentina, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/16, Award, TT 85, 88, 296-304 (Sept. 28, 2007); Enron
v. Argentina, ICSID Case No.ARB/01/3, Award, 44, 47, 264-68 (May 22, 2007); LG&E
v. Argentina, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/1, Decision on Liability, 99 42, 49, 52, 127-39 (Oct.
3, 2006); CMS v. Argentina, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/8, Award, 9 57-58, 266-81 (May 12,
2005).
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These are not necessarily contractual legal obligations.76 For investment
tribunals, however, the expectations benchmark is imposed by the
standard of fair and equitable treatment.77 The rationale is that foreign
investors and states should be treated as parties in a bargain rather
than as an individual and the state in a regulatory relationship.78
To be sure, this does not mean that states always need to pay
compensation. When changing their laws, however, states must take
care not to disturb foreign investors' legitimate expectations.79 These
expectations are exactly the ones that Argentina frustrated when it
abolished the PPI. Fair and equitable treatment and legitimate
expectations can be reduced, therefore, to a broad interpretation of the
principle of pacta sunt servanda. Argentina could take any general and
nondiscriminatory measure, so long as it observed its contractual,
quasicontractual, and implicitly assumed duties.8 0
After the tribunals specified foreign investor rights and state duties,
sometimes balancing the private and public interests at stake, the next
question for the arbitrators was whether Argentina could escape
liability by relying either on the exception contained in article 11 of its
bilateral investment treaty with the United States81 or on a state-of-
necessity exception under general international law.8 2 In most disputes,
the arbitrators decided in the negative, given that Argentina had
contributed to the crisis.8 3 This debate attracted much attention in the
literature, which viewed it through the lens of the exceptional or the
76. CMS v. Argentina, ICSID Case No. ARBI018, Annulment Decision, 89 (Sept. 25,
2007).
77. Int'l Thunderbird Gaming Corp. v. Mexico, UNCITRAL, Award and Separate
Opinion of Thomas W. Walde, 37 (Jan. 26, 2006).
78. VAN HARTEN, supra note 40, at 45; DAVID SCHNEIDERMAN, CONSTITUTIONALIZING
EcoNoMIc GLOBALIZATION: INVESTMENT RULES AND DEMOCRACY'S PROMISE 9-13 (2008).
79. Electrabel S.A. v. Hungary, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/19, Decision on Jurisdiction,
Applicable Law and Liability, 7.77 (Nov. 30, 2012); Frontier Petroleum v. Czech
Republic, UNCITRAL, Award, 285 (Perm. Ct. Arb. 2010); PSEG v. Turkey, ICSID Case
No. ARB/02/5, Award, 255 (Jan. 19, 2007).
80. Investment tribunals are quite flexible regarding the basis for legitimate
expectations. See Christoph Schreuer, Fair and Equitable Treatment in Arbitral Practice,
6 J. WORLD INV. & TRADE 357, 374 (2005).
81. Treaty Between United States of America and the Argentine Republic Concerning
the Reciprocal Encouragement and Protection of Investment, U.S.-Arg., Nov. 14, 1991, S.
TREATY Doc. No. 103-2 (1994).
82. The awards have discussed whether the exception contained in the bilateral
investment treaty is a specification of the customary defense of necessity or a self-standing
provision. Giorgio Sacerdoti, The Application of BITs in Time of Economic Crisis: Limits to
Their Coverage, Necessity and the Relevance of WTO Law, in GENERAL INTERESTS OF HOST
STATES IN INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAw 3, 11-13 (Giorgio Sacerdoti et al. eds., 2014).
83. Id. at 14.
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extraordinary.8 4 The legal problem, however, could be presented in
different terms. State actions may no longer be exceptional-or at least
may be less exceptional-if we assume that the fundamental reason for
state authority is to prevent private property from destroying other
individuals and the community. State coordination of resources and
economic activity, depending on the way we frame the question, can be
seen as either an exceptional or a normal public function.
C. The Governance of Resources and Neoliberal Legality
The study of the investment disputes arising from the 2001
Argentine crisis shows that the legal interface for governing resources
extends from property to contractual techniques. Particular
arrangements are not necessarily purely proprietary or contractual, and
individuals and the state can create different forms of arrangements
along these lines.8 5 One way to engage with these diverse legal
techniques is to focus on the question of efficiency, the typical Law and
Economics analysis. On this analysis, individuals and the state choose
proprietary arrangements when they are looking for standardization.
8 6
They rely on legislation when they prefer circulation to a more detailed
scope of the rights. When it comes to specifying rights over resources,
however, individuals and states prefer to rely on contractual or
quasicontractual techniques.8 7 This efficiency analysis can serve to
identify the best means, but it can also lead to overlooking some of the
reasons for choosing property or contract.88 Private property rights
grant control to owners but also allow an important space for state
regulation. Contractual techniques are employed to define the scope of
rights for specific projects, but they also serve to fulfil the increasing
need for private calculability, which is an imperative for promoting
growth according to a neoliberal rationality.
The contractualization of private-public relations, in other words,
implies a subversion of the essential premise of private property and
public authority.8 9 Contractual techniques can shape state behaviour in
84. See generally Jirgen Kurtz, Adjudging the Exceptional at International Investment
Law: Security, Public Order and Financial Crisis, 59 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 325 (2010)
(suggesting that a state's enactment of emergency measures to preserve the public order
can, at the international level, be viewed as either an exceptional or extraordinary act by
the state).
85. See Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, The Property/Contract Interface, 101
COLUM. L. REV. 773, 797-98 (2001).
86. Id. at 778-79.
87. Id.
88. See Frank I. Michelman, "There Have to Be Four", 64 MD. L. REV. 136, 157 (2005).
89. Zumbansen, supra note 11, at 193-95.
INDIANA JOURNAL OF GLOBAL LEGAL STUDIES 23:2
ways that are unimaginable under a proprietary paradigm. Contracts
not only clarify the scope of ownership but also strengthen private
property, in particular, if they are interpreted and enforced under an
expansive interpretation of pacta sunt servanda. Property rules and
regulations are the result of a democratic process and remain subject to
change; contracts, by contrast, are the outcome of individual bargaining
and must be kept and enforced.
III. CONTRACTUALIZATION AFTER THE 2008 GLOBAL ECONOMIC CRISIS:
RUPTURE OR CONTINUITY?
This final section explores where we stand after the 2008 global
economic crisis. It argues that this is mostly an era of continuity, not of
rupture, at least with respect to the contractualization of foreign
investment relations. This legality continues to respond to a particular
logic of government, advancing a market rationale for public action
modeled on the idea of transaction. What lies outside this rationale is
unreasonable and arbitrary because it may impact negatively on
private-led economic growth. Nevertheless, something has changed.
There is little doubt today that the private sector can get much wrong,
having led the entire world into a severe economic crisis in 2008.90 This
means not only that individuals create negative externalities, but also
that the market alone cannot deal with these undesired side effects
adequately. Suddenly, there is a new need for the state to coordinate
private use of resources.91
The call for a more active state, however, does not say much about
the way governments should act in light of everyday corporate
challenges. We do not know what works.92 For instance, we do not know
how states should behave given the evidence that foreign investment
can negatively impact local communities. The postcrisis era requires
recognizing the importance of noneconomic values, such as
environmental and human rights concerns, but without losing the focus
on pacta sunt servanda and foreign investor expectations. The neo-
utilitarian purpose can accept contractualization to adapt to the new
demands, but clearly not to change radically. What is interesting about
the postcrisis era is that the maximization of wealth and noneconomic
values have become blended in new and creative ways. Growth and
private profit are presently fundamental goals of states because the way
to grow continues to be to facilitate private profit. At the same time,
90. See Altvater, supra note 1.
91. ROBERTS, supra note 10, at 17-21.
92. See David Kennedy, "The Mystery of Global Governance", 34 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 827,
830-35 (2008) [hereinafter Kennedy, Global Governance].
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environmental protection and human rights have become important
multinational corporate objectives, since these firms cannot continue
doing business if there is strong evidence of their involvement with
environmental disasters and human rights violations. This new
perception of the roles of MNCs and states can only favor
contractualization and the equivalence of these two actors.
93
Against this background, the governance of foreign investment has
incorporated noneconomic goals through two different strategies. The
first is CSR. This is a business strategy inspired by the premise that
private investment can promote economic growth and respect for the
environment and human rights.94 The justification is precisely profit,
because irresponsible business ends up being unprofitable or missing
business opportunities. The second strategy is the use of proportionality
in investment arbitration.95 The main actors of this regime (i.e. states,
foreign investors, lawyers, and arbitrators) realized that the legitimacy
crisis of the 11R was putting the entire regime at risk. A transactional
model may not always respond satisfactorily when states aim at
implementing measures to protect the environment. Schneiderman
notes that a reflexivity process began at this moment.
96 This process
triggered the negotiation of new treaties and new arbitral
interpretations, according to which it is necessary to balance foreign
investor expectations and the right of states to regulate. This
recognition does not imply deciding which principle should prevail,
either private foreign-led growth or environmental protection; rather, it
implies balancing the two using proportionality.
97
Before moving on to analyze these postcrisis strategies, it is
important to highlight a common thread connecting CSR and
proportionality. Both promote transparency and proceduralism. A
strong premise of these strategies is to show what is being done, either
in expert meetings or in the reasoning of an award, and to foster
participation from nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and other
actors in the creation of CSR and the proceedings of investment
93. See ULRICH STEGER, CORPORATE DIPLOMACY: THE STRATEGY FOR A VOLATILE,
FRAGMENTED BUsINESS ENVIRONMENT 41-44 (2003).
94. See MILES, supra note 39, at 215-39.
95. See Benedict Kingsbury & Stephan W. Schill, Public Law Concepts to Balance
Investors' Rights with State Regulatory Actions in the Public Interest-The Concept of
Proportionality, in INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW AND COMPARATIVE PUBLIc LAW 75,
97 (Stephan W. Schill ed., 2010).
96. David Schneiderman, Legitimacy and Reflexivity in International Investment
Arbitration: A New Self-Restraint?, 2 J. INT'L DISPUTE SETTLEMENT 471, 483-94 (2011).
97. See JUrgen Kurtz, The Shifting Landscape of International Investment Law and Its
Commentary, 106 AM. J. INTL L. 686, 693 (2012).
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arbitration.98 The converse of this procedural openness is that CSR and
proportionality conceal normative issues behind a veil of expertise and
participation.99 In the field of foreign investment, these normative
issues often relate to the implications of foreign investor rights beyond
state regulatory authority, in particular, the consequences that foreign
investment has on local communities.
A. Corporate Social Responsibility
As Miles recognizes, the expectations we have for CSR are based on
market mechanisms.10 0 CSR does not challenge the neoliberal model of
private-led growth, and no one who promotes it suggests that states
should reconsider their approaches to the governance of resources. On
the contrary, by promoting CSR, neoliberal means and ends are
reinforced.10' MNCs want to lose neither business opportunities nor
profit. On this view, market actors can after all satisfactorily perform
coordination functions. They just need some help from states, in
particular, by making some voluntary CSR rules mandatory. 102
CSR acknowledges some potential negative externalities of private-
led growth, and aims to find an acceptable balance between economic
and noneconomic values. A number of different actors, including states
as well as MNC and NGO experts, participate in this balancing process.
These discussions, however, are very different from what we are used to
seeing in national legislatures. It is not the democratic process that
characterized the twentieth century. First, the corporate sector engages
in these discussions as a very strong and active party. Firms do not
need lobbies anymore; they can express their views directly. They are
also the more powerful party because they can always walk away from
negotiations or divest from specific countries. Second, the core of these
discussions is not about values and norms. What matters most is
expertise, not the wishes and desires of any local population. Experts
rely on technical and scientific arguments because they need to appear
neutral and objective, detached from political positions. This emphasis
on expertise gives another advantage to their findings: in addition to
neutrality, they have a global scope of application.
98. See LANG, supra note 5, at 326-46.
99. Duncan Kennedy, Three Globalizations of Law and Legal Thought: 1850-2000, in
THE NEw LAW AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT: A CRITICAL APPRAISAL 19, 63-70 (David M.
Trubek & Alvaro Santos eds., 2006); David Schneiderman, Judging in Secular Times: Max
Weber and the Rise of Proportionality, 63 SUP. CT. L. REV. 557, 558-60 (2013).
100. MILES, supra note 39, at 223-24.
101. Kennedy, Global Governance, supra note 92, at 851.
102. MILES, supra note 39, at 287.
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While it is true that these expert discussions may be public, most of
the population cannot participate or follow them directly. The center of
democracy has unquestionably moved away from voting, and presently
what can make a larger difference is citizen participation in the
regulatory process.10 3 But what is sometimes disregarded is that this
process has also become global and delocalized. Altogether, expertise
and globalization move the center of gravity of this decision-making
process too far away from most local communities. CSR has thus become
a global site of struggle for rules under the control of experts.
The increasing number of CSR rules can have important effects on
the IIR. The United Nations Global Compact or the Principles for
Responsible Agricultural Investment can shape interpretation.10 4 The
existence of these standards can facilitate the consideration of
noneconomic values in the context of investment arbitrations. Thus, for
instance, CSR rules may influence the existence of foreign investor
legitimate expectations in an agriculture project. These rules may
include concrete responsible investment standards that foreign
investors need to take into consideration when establishing a project.105
At the treaty-drafting level, there has been a gradual inclusion of
environmental and human rights references in the treaties, consistent
with the increasing use of CSR. Having these references in the treaties
does improve the outlook for attaining noneconomic goals, but the actual
effects will depend on interpretation, in particular, of the balancing
techniques.
When analysing these positive effects, however, we should not
overlook the pitfalls of CSR. The most important is the reinforcement of
neoliberalism and the contractualization of foreign investment relations.
In the postcrisis era, market supervision of states expands from public
intervention in the use of resources to any measure taken to curb
private negative externalities. The market acknowledges its limitations,
yet demands tools that mimic what the market would do in a situation
of full information and no transaction costs.106 CSR emerges as a form of
"private" legal transplant. In terms of authority, then, as Ferrando
103. See PIERRE ROSANVALLON, LA CONTRE-DEMOCRATIE: LA POLITIQUE A L'AGE DE LA
DEFIANCE (2006).
104. See The Ten Principles of the UN Global Compact, UNGLoBALIMPACr.ORG (last
visited May 4, 2016), https://www.unglobalcompact.org/what-is-gc/mission/principles.
105. NicolAs Marcelo Perrone, Responsible Agricultural Investment: Is There a
Significant Role for the Law to Promote Sustainability?, COLUM. FDI PERSP., no. 38, 2011
(discussing the use of international guidelines to promote foreign direct investment into
countries that need capital and technology to grow while protecting the concerns of the
host country).
106. Kennedy, supra note 29, at 40-41.
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notes, little changes.10 7 The contemporary IIR may not be fully
explicable anymore through nineteenth century imperialism, as Miles
suggests, but there is a different hegemony today: MNCs and expert
knowledge.
B. Proportionality
With respect to proportionality, I argue that its reasoning is only a
marginal adjustment to the contractualization of foreign investment
relations. Schneiderman notes that proportionality is a Weberian form
of rational and formal bureaucratic reasoning08 This means that it is
difficult to dissociate it from the goal of facilitating the expansion of
capitalistic activities. A legal standard like proportionality allows
investment arbitrators to appear neutral and objective. This became
necessary once it was clear that arbitral decisions could not continue
making claims to the effect that the IIR favours foreign investors or that
investment treaties should be interpreted in dubio pro investor. 09 But
this should not make us overlook that the goal of proportionality is
precisely to adapt neoliberal legality to the reality of the postcrisis era.
Proportionality assumes that neither foreign investor expectations
nor host state goals should annihilate the other.1 0 By implementing
proportionality, investment tribunals incorporate a tool formally
capable of focusing both on the legitimate expectations of foreign
investors and on negative externalities. Looking at proportionality
stricto sensu, we find that state means and state ends are the two
crucial factors: i.e., the deprivation of foreign investor rights and the
host state's goals."' Proportionality aims to reach a balance, but this
balance is struck in the shadow of the contractualization of foreign
investment relations and the legitimate expectations doctrine. This
introduces the problems I identified above in the Argentine cases: in
particular, the expansive interpretation of foreign investor rights vis-a-
vis host state sovereignty.
In addition to foreign investor rights, another factor determining
107. Tomaso Ferrando, Private Legal Transplant: Multinational Enterprises as Proxies
of Legal Homogenisation, 5 TRANSNAT'L LEGAL THEORY 20, 20 (2014) (discussing the
attempts of transnational enterprises to create or modify laws in foreign countries to serve
the capitalist mode of production).
108. Schneiderman, supra note 99, at 561-67.
109. Soci6t6 G~n6rale de Surveillance S.A. v. Republic of the Phil., ICSID Case No.
ARB/02/6, Objections to Jurisdiction, 116 (Jan. 29, 2004).
110. See Alec Stone Sweet, Investor-State Arbitration: Proportionality's New Frontier, 4
LAW & ETHICS HUM. RTs. 47, 62-63 (2010).
111. See Total S.A. v. Arg. Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/04/01, Liability, 123 (Dec.
27, 2010).
INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT REGIME AFTER NEOLIBERALISM 625
proportionality is the assessment of negative externalities and host
state goals. The greater the private fault, the more legitimate a public
remedy will be. If there is no negative externality, by contrast, the state
may need to pay compensation to implement a regulatory change.112 The
determination of these factors depends on an assessment carried out by
investment arbitrators and global experts. In the case of the Argentine
crisis, for instance, tribunals had to determine-either explicitly or
implicitly-whether international organizations and foreign investors
contributed to the crisis, in addition to Argentine wrongdoing. In theory,
this judgement should be sensitive to the local situation. But local
particularities could make a muddle of investment awards. The risk is
not only that tribunals might come to different decisions in similar
cases; it is also that arbitrators could end up following different
normative values in their awards. The investment law literature
acknowledges different goals such as environmental protection and
human rights, but only from a global perspective in which private-led
economic growth remains fundamental."
3
In this context, bureaucratic judgements resulting from a technical
assessment of the circumstances prevail over political decisions.114 For
instance, the Australian and Uruguayan population can decide to
implement the plain packaging of tobacco products because they prefer
a community free of tobacco, but they need to justify this measure based
on scientific evidence.115 It is not a question of social preferences or
vulnerabilities but of market failures and negative externalities. Politics
can be done, in short, but only on the fringes of this expert-led
process.116
As Metzger put it fifty years ago, once foreign investors take control
of key resources of an economy, there will be few opportunities to
112. See Joseph William Singer, How Property Norms Construct the Externalities of
Ownership, in PROPERTY AND COMMUNITY 57, 61-66 (Gregory S. Alexander & Eduardo M.
Pefialver eds., 2010); Frank I. Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness: Comments on
the Ethical Foundations of "Just Compensation" Law, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1165, 1175-77
(1967).
113. See Christoph Schreuer & Ursula Kriebaum, From Individual to Community
Interest in International Investment Law, in FROM BILATERALISM TO COMMUNITY
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implement orderly political change.117 Not only is neoliberal legality
consistent with this claim, it is also constitutive of it. Postcrisis legality
is about adjusting details, and proportionality in the context of
contractualization is capable of carrying out some adjustments-no
more. The description of proportionality provided by Schneiderman fits
perfectly into this narrative. Proportionality appears as an ideal form of
reasoning to minimize the influence of politics. Investment arbitrators
do not need to make any normative decision in favor of foreign
investors. They can simply uphold their expectations without making
normative arguments because proportionality operates in the shadow of
contractualization and global expertise.
CONCLUSION: NEOLIBERALISM QUITEAS USUAL
One way to think about neoliberalism is as a lens to frame and
answer fundamental economic, social, and political questions. When the
neoliberal model entered into a deep legitimacy crisis in 2008, this
unsurprisingly revitalized some debates about the role of the state that
seemed finished twenty years before. The mainstream critique,
however, never questioned wealth maximization as a purpose, or private
action as the most efficient means to achieve this purpose. On the
contrary, it just centred on private negative externalities and their
implications for the environment and human rights. With this situation
in mind, this article asked whether this balancing strategy constitutes
rupture or continuity with neoliberalism and the neoliberal legality that
shapes the role of foreign investors and host states in the governance of
resources. I find that the means to grant, exercise, and protect foreign
investor control of resources remain substantially the same,
corroborating the continuity hypothesis, at least in this field.
The IIR in this way remains a paradigmatic example of neoliberal
legality. The contractualization of foreign investment relations provides
foreign investors with the calculability required to dedicate their
energies to maximizing wealth. After the global economic crisis, most of
the discussions about the IIR revolve around regulation and not around
private control of resources. Part III showed that there is a general
belief in many circles that MNCs' desire for profit can adjust corporate
conduct through CSR. If states still need to act to curb private negative
externalities, this view claims that these measures should mimic what
markets would do if there was complete information. States, in other
words, are expected not to disappoint business expectations unless it is
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absolutely necessary.
The study of proportionality confirms this view. Part III also showed
that only foreign investors have discretion to make genuine decisions
regarding resources in both the neoliberal and the postcrisis eras; for
host states, it is just politics at the fringes of an expert-led process. This
is a chief consequence of contractualization, and proportionality does
not change this fundamental ground rule. Only a radical change in our
perception of the role of the state would give governments political
responsibility for coordinating private economic rights beyond negative
externalities and market failures. But today the return of a sovereignty-
proprietary paradigm seems distant. The major reason for a return to
large state involvement in the economy would be the inability of the
MNC sector to deliver the expected levels of growth.
The construction of a real alternative to neoliberalism, in any case,
requires more than state involvement in the economy. With regard to
the control of resources, at least, it would be necessary to opt for a more
pluralistic purpose for world resources. The global and individual
obsession with economic growth has much to do with the pervasiveness
of neoliberalism. A thick understanding of the social obligations of
property owners has not been dismissed because they cannot deliver
more equal and fair societies. It has been dismissed because they are
considered unsuitable to reach efficient levels of wealth maximization.
Along these lines, the real threat to neoliberalism consists of a change of
purpose. This would put into crisis not only neoliberal legality but also
corporate power and the homo economicus. A starting point for any
transformation of this kind would require reconsidering fundamental
social and political questions. The challenge exceeds the law if we
conceive the law as a means to other social and economic purposes. In
our current times, then, Hamlet's dilemma would need to be expressed
in different terms. The great classic of today might need to begin
differently, and borrowing the words of Fromm, I suggest it would read,
"To have or to be": that is the question.118
118. ERICH FROMM, To HAVE OR TO BE? 3 (1976).
